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The Bias of Mediatization: Utopia in Charlottesville
Abstract. the paper reconstructs Harold innis’ idea of media’s bias. it is argued that media construct 
a view of the future in line with temporalized Platonism that excludes people that belong to the past. 
the clash of statues and media in Charlottesville presented mediatization as a progressive but not 
dialectical force. Statues and media did not check each other’s biases. Media embody the confrontation 
of authority and publicity (Habermas) or the enlightenment and absolutism (Koselleck). after the 
neoliberal commercialization, the enlightenment acquired the form of utopian future that confronts 
the media logic against conservative forces. the truth is constructed according to the prescribed future. 
trump blamed all, in accordance with the absolutist principle. Commercial media professionalism 
stood by its enlightenment origins and accused trump of revitalizing forces of the past. Because most 
citizens were against taking down the statues, commercialized media logic was less receiver steering 
than the public service media.
Keywords: mediatization; neoliberalism; populism, bias of communication; donald trump
The counterrevolution
While arguing that populism is a cultural backlash against post-materialistic 
values, Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris (2016) paraphrased Herbert Marcuse by 
saying populism is a “counterrevolutionary revolt”. But this had a materialistic, an-
ti-capitalist meaning in the Nixon era. For Marcuse (1969, p. 65) mass media “speak 
day and night for the dominant interests” and “radical Left has no equal access to the 
great chains of information and indoctrination” (Marcuse 1972, p. 55). James Curran 
(2011, p. 32) states that counterculture’s anti-war effort was mostly reported “in terms 
of the threat it posed to public order/military morale and the deviant life style” and 
there was only a “constrained, elite-driven way” of critique. Noam Chomsky (1989, p. 
227) supported Marcusean views years later: “the media were almost entirely closed 
to principled critics of the war and representatives of the mass popular movements 
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that spontaneously developed, considerably more closed, in fact, than they have been 
in the 1980s”.
Chomsky’s view that the 1980s were better than sixties or seventies can help us to 
understand why Inglehart and Norris tried to act as Marcuseans themselves. Marcuse 
(1972, p. 24) said that “freedom of expression hardly exists for the blacks”, whereas 
the case of Donald Trump in general and Charlottesville in particular point to a huge 
media change in contemporary societies. Media were not closed to African Americans 
and their popular movement, and the Confederate side was presented as the deviant 
one. Whether that means that media now do not speak for the dominant interests is, 
I am afraid, a different matter. 
What happened between the two “counterrevolutions”? A change in the neoliberal 
hegemony is as striking as the media change. Counterculture for Friedrich Hayek 
(1998, p. 174) was a product of “non-domesticated savages” that refused the “bur-
den of culture” and could not tell the difference between good and evil. Things were 
worse for African Americans. Milton Friedman (1982, p. 112) maintained that hiring 
“white clerks in preference to Negroes” is not a prejudice, but “transmitting the tastes 
of the community”. Alexander Rüstow (1980, p. 40) had a theory that slavery lasted 
so long because “Negroes from Africa (…) living in archaic superstratified empires, 
had for years been bred and raised to be submissive”. This is what neoliberals were 
saying for decades.
Now, neoliberals seem progressive and countercultural. They are not the bearers 
of “the whole complex of aggression and targets [that] indicates a proto-fascist po-
tential par excellence” (Marcuse 1972, p. 28). The Democrats embraced this ideology 
as early as Carter administration and until Bernie Sanders it remained undisputed. 
Corporate media are somehow supportive of the Black Lives Matter. This paradoxical 
co-evolution of neoliberalism and mediatization is the background of the special bias 
of mediatization. Is it possible that racial games in the USA can actually help further 
neoliberalization, even though original neoliberals were not very keen on the coun-
terculture and African Americans? And is it possible this kind of mediatization is not 
the best way to fight populism?
In this paper I will try to show the nature of the relationship between mediatiza-
tion and populism. Through interdisciplinary critical framework I will relate social 
to discourse structures (van Dijk 2018, p. 27) and present the “capitalist character” 
of the “power behind discourse” (Fairclough 2018, p. 14). My overall approach is 
thoroughly influenced by Frankfurt School’s tradition. In the next section, I will use 
Habermas’ and Koselleck’s theories to deconstruct mediatization and discuss the ne-
glected element – interplay. In line with the critical perspective, this will help to 
show the corporate background of the media structure that shapes ideological and 
socio-political configuration of messages. In the third section, I will refer to Innis and 
Koselleck in order to question media’s time bias and its logic of Enlightenment. Time 
bias is a matter of collective identity. It drives society’s relationship with past and future.
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To check this theoretical framework, I will examine the case of clashes over Con-
federate statue in Charlottesville, that is, a struggle between old, heavy media and the 
light ones. I will use multiperspectival interpretative method (Kellner 1995) and frame 
analysis (de Vreese 2014). Today’s political conflict over American identity was at its 
most regressive in clashes between activists that wanted to bring down or keep the 
statue of a Confederate commander. Conflict embodied a political polarization in con-
temporary America between conservative and progressive forces. Monuments are the 
oldest medium with a conservative time bias, that in Charlottesville was confronted 
with a light, electronic media with a future-oriented bias. This case showed the bias of 
mediatization that is a matter not just of social construction but of political economy.
The interplay
Mediatization denotes the interplay between media-communicative change and 
socio-cultural change. Unfortunately, this is usually understood as a theory of media 
influence on the society, not the interplay as such. What is specific about mediatiza-
tion is certainly the analysis of the power of media-communicative change, but that 
is not what is pertinent. Mediatization could contribute to social theory (Couldry 
2014) only if the focus is on the dialectic of reciprocities between the media and 
the society (Hepp 2013, p. 44). The interplay of media’s and state’s meta-capital, or 
the interplay of different meta-processes, is something that critical theory should be 
concerned about. Media’s meta-capital is constructed within a social structure marked 
by neoliberal globalization meta-process. The roll-back of the welfare state and media 
commercialization are not just parallel but complementary processes. Although rising 
inequality and austerity policies created the conditions for a populist reaction, this 
is rarely sufficiently acknowledged. When it comes to media populism as a “nexus of 
influences” between media logic and populism (Mazzoleni 2014, p. 47), the problem 
is still the interplay: “media logic and media populism appear to be somewhat over-
lapping concepts” (p. 48). And what is the actual connection between phenomenon 
of populism and media logic?
This problem is understandable at the start of a great tradition, that I believe 
mediatization will become. It is asking the right questions, but if it is going to be an 
interdisciplinary approach then it should not examine the interplay from mediacentric 
perspective. It should actually become a social theory. Mediatization is a contextually 
sensitive process (Peruško 2017), therefore, we need to theorize this context, the 
whole interplay, in order to understand mediatization and its role in the society. One 
way to do it is to examine what social thinkers call mediatization. Jürgen Habermas 
(1989, p. 27) defined it as a “mode of balancing power”, like in the “demarcation of 
estate liberties from the prince’s overlordship”. Mediatization was a way to establish 
some boundaries between the monarch on one side and bourgeois and aristocra-
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cy on the other side, to “mediatize” the power within society. After late capitalism 
brought the fragmentation into special-interest parties, the “mediatized public” (p. 
177) produced not critical but “manipulative publicity” (p. 178) with an intent to 
“neutralize political counterpressure” (p. 200). A mode of balancing became a mode of 
colonization. 
Reinhart Koselleck (1988, p. 39) provided a different view: “mediatising the eccle-
siastical conflicts” implied neutralizing those conflictual discourses that constantly 
lead to “civil war”. In Charlottesville’s case, it would call for “moral neutrality” and 
suspension of the moral conflicts by the “sovereign decision” (p. 38). Kosseleck re-
minds us that, unlike aristocracy, the goal of bourgeois was not to create a balance 
of political and economic power. The bourgeois did not seek a peaceful arrangement 
with the monarch. Not a balance of power, but a conflictual discourse against Abso-
lutism and for the Republic was essentially a moral argument for a total social change. 
Instead of suspending the moral conflicts, the bourgeois reintroduced them in order 
to benefit from permanent civil conflict. For Kosseleck it is the sovereign state that is 
mediatizing struggles, suspending the conflictual discourses in order to reach peace. 
Commercial media were mediatizing a revolution.
Of course, both examples are not what is ordinarily understood as mediatization. 
They are closer to the idea of social mediation, but they are important if we con-
centrate on the interplay. Habermas’ (1989, p. 73) mediatization implies a tension 
between authority and publicity, the “disproportion of economic power and political 
powerlessness” (p. 69). It is a “political confrontation (…) against the public author-
ities themselves, to engage them in a debate over the general rules” in the “sphere of 
commodity exchange and social labour” (p. 27). Commercial media, therefore, play 
a special role in determining the social and market rules. On the other hand, Koselleck 
understands this as a confrontation of the principles of Enlightenment and Absolutism. 
But it is a whole different matter when commercialization and the Enlightenment are 
on the same, neoliberal side. In Hegelian terms, they are “a powerful bloc in opposition 
to the organized state” (Habermas 1989, p. 119). The monarch is merely human, “and 
as a man he could be nothing but a usurper (…) a brutal tyrant” (Koselleck 1988, 
p. 119). Quotes describing 18th-century France sound so familiar in the Trump era. 
If the first consequence of neoliberal mediatization was marketization of society 
by proclaiming the value of economic freedom, the second problem was connected 
to this in a way that now every social relation is seen only as a form of competition. 
Marcuse (1991, p. 92) teaches us every society is marked by contradictions, but one-di-
mensional society embraces the “principle of the logic of manipulation – realistic 
caricature of dialectics”. This fake society has to produce fake news. That is, constant 
conflicts without resolution. Media fail to reconcile conflicted parties not just because 
its logic is one of dramatization and emotionalization, but because this logic is a product 
of neoliberal competitive discourse. Frame of conflict reigns. Commercialized media 
cannot accept what Axel Honneth (1995, p. 23) sees as a special dimension of social 
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conflicts, their “moral-practical potential for learning”, for deliberation that can create 
“an interpretative framework for a process of moral formation” (p. 168). Balance of 
power is not a goal. It can only be endless war.
Time of the Utopia
Time is a “relationship between past and future” (Koselleck 2002, p. 111). With-
out some perspective on time we are practically humans with banal nationalisms or 
religions. This is Marcuse’s (1991, p. 100) message to one-dimensional societies: the 
second dimension is “historical”; it discovers “potentiality as historical possibility”. In 
this context, Innis’ idea can be understood for what it is. “The bias of communication 
in space or in time involves a sponge theory of the distribution of wealth” (Innis 2008, 
p. 76). No technodeterminism in sight. The cultural “bias of significance” (p. 33) de-
pends on medium’s emphasis on knowledge dissemination over time or space, but it 
is not just a matter of media’s materiality but of political economy. Society’s collective 
identity is based on the relationship between past and future, but time bias also de-
pends on the distribution of wealth. For Innis, medium’s time bias (e.g. monuments) 
refers to religion, tradition and decentralized society (p. 36), while space bias of the 
“light media” is connected to the growth of trade, industry, administration and the 
rise of the vernacular, which facilitated the creation of Protestantism and critical press 
(p. 58). How is this connected to the political economy?
There is constant debate on how we can understand today’s problem of populism. 
For most, it is a struggle between populism and liberal democracy. But for classical 
liberalism the state and the market were confronted. The market actors requested the 
implementation of the laissez-faire principle, so that the market does not get disturbed; 
the state was concerned that economy benefits all. That tension is gone in neoliberalism 
– it is the state that has a primary goal of creating, facilitating and maintaining the 
market. The state and the market are closely interconnected (Balibar 2015, p. 103). It 
is possible even to do away with democracy. Neoliberals are ready, if the order of the 
free market is in any way threatened, to “temporarily suspend” the “principle of the 
free society” (Hayek 1998, p. 124). The sovereign has to be able to introduce the state 
of emergency (e.g. Trump’s wall) to preserve the order. Hayek does not have a problem 
with “abolishing democracy (…) in defense of economic freedom” (Streeck 2011, 
p. 7). Actually, along with Friedman, Hayek supported exactly that in Pinochet’s Chile.
Today’s struggle of populism and neoliberalism should be understood as a regressive 
conflict between democracy and liberty (Bonefeld 2017, p. 15), a struggle between 
their degenerated forms. From a political economy perspective, it is also a tension 
between the national and transnational capital (Močnik 2017). Donald Trump, along 
with Breitbart and the business class that did not globalize its assets, belong to the 
national capital’s side. Hillary Clinton, transnational media corporations such as Am-
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azon or Facebook, belong to the other side. The conflict looks pretty clear. When it 
comes to news media, it is a tension between Breitbart and, for example, Washington 
Post, owned by Amazon’s CEO. When it comes to big data problem, the tension is 
between Cambridge Analytica and Facebook, Google, or any other transnational 
company related to this issue. It is about interests, not values, because they are all, 
Democrats and Republicans – neoliberals (Habermas 2012, p. 104). Therefore, it is 
always a story about the distribution of wealth, but within capital itself – it is not 
a capital vs. labour struggle. If we fail to relate this social structure to media discourses, 
critical examination will not be possible.
With this in mind we can turn back to Innis’ idea of time bias. He believed French 
Revolution could be explained only by taking wealth into consideration. If one actor 
accumulates too much wealth, others will attack its monopoly over time. In the case 
of absolute monarchy, those actors for Innis were church and the state (2008, p. 76), 
as time and space bias entities. Church is closer to the heavy media and the state is 
more secular, light media oriented. But were they actually the ones who accumulated 
too much wealth? This is different than Habermas’ account of political powerlessness 
of the state against the rising bourgeois, or Koselleck’s view of Absolutism’s collapse. 
Although we can agree with Innis’ “sponge theory”, it is doubtful whether his expla-
nation of the revolution is entirely correct. Nevertheless, his description of modern 
capitalist age shows the triumph of certain banal Enlightenment, where sense of 
time was destroyed by commercialism, and that “fascism, communism and our way 
of life” (p. 88) were a reaction to this. Light media were the commercial ones, on the 
side of the bourgeois in the Habermasian political confrontation between authority 
and publicity. Commercial media were producing a worldview in line with the market 
actors’ ideology. 
On the other hand, it is interesting Innis does not consider progress as a form of 
time but as perpetual movement and a category of space monopoly. Maybe his original 
understanding of time was too conservative. It had no relationship to the future. For 
Koselleck, enlightened philosophers had more to offer. Utopia, an imagined social 
perfection, is not placed in a foreign space anymore but in a foreign time. The “per-
fectio ideal” (Koselleck 2002, p. 90) was temporalized. A promise of the new world 
brought simultaneous denying of the old, and because this doctrine was a moral one, 
reality was “not only incomplete, limited, or unstable but also immoral” (Koselleck 
1988, p. 152). It is considered immoral even without Trump. It is immoral because 
it is not suited for the desired future. It is possible to differentiate values and social 
relations that should be overcome, that have no place in the future projections of 
a certain victory of the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment served just one side of the 
political confrontation, which is today a transnational capital’s side. “Doomsday” (p. 
182) is reserved for the people of the past and their collective identity: nationalists and 
alt-right, while the progressive humankind awaits a space biased utopia as “a polit-
ically unsecured loan (…) being called in” (p. 186). Absolutist domination over all 
Pobrane z czasopisma Mediatizations Studies http://mediatization.umcs.pl
Data: 20/11/2019 22:16:50
UM
CS
75the Bias of Mediatization: utopia in Charlottesville
subjects and the neutralization of conflictual discourses within the civil society (e.g. 
the role of the President) are unacceptable relics that have no place in the future. This 
is a completely different, even provocative view of the progress, because Koselleck 
sees Absolutism as a guarantee of peace that suspended the ecclesiastical conflicts of 
Protestants and Catholics, and after its fall new social conflicts appeared.
Absolutism was advocating a frozen, completely static state, while the Enlightenment 
was a progressive doctrine. Its goal was to “write of the past and create its substance 
out of the future” (Koselleck 2004, p. 54). Once this future utopia became central, “ex-
pectations have moved from all previous experiences” (Koselleck 2002, p. 128). New 
ideologies like liberalism or socialism, even fascism, had “no content in terms of expe-
rience” (p. 29). This position allowed Koselleck to represent the Enlightenment as “the 
violence of spirit and reason, a violence that eradicates all violence” (p. 91), an excuse 
for the attack on everything conservative. Conservative being, of course, when you want 
to make something great again. This “great again” implies a past condition, and Trump 
does not want to conserve it, because he has to construct it again. It is a lost past that 
has to be re-made, according to the national capital’s interests and its time bias. On the 
other hand, transnational capital and its commercial media want to stop this process. The 
Enlightenment, this “subjectively pure will to peace” apparently has war-like character-
istics that can lead to “bellum omnium contra omnes” (Koselleck 1988, p. 28), because its 
vision of the peace is excluding the losers. As a moral doctrine, it has all the right to do 
so. “Progress became the modus vivendi of criticism (…). It made available a sphere of 
absolute freedom in the present to the executor of criticism” (p. 110). Absolute freedom 
is a freedom to exclude. The problem is Trump is its opponent.
Other methodological concerns
Koselleck was writing this in the time of the Cold War, and saw opposing sides as 
two moral doctrines that approve the destruction of the other. That is, while absolutist 
monarchy has established social peace by breaking all its opponents, now everyone 
wants this power. What Koselleck (1988, p. 18) was saying about the monarch, that 
“he must subjugate all or no one would be subjugated”, is now something that all sides 
encourage. National and transnational capitals have their own moral doctrines, albeit 
this is not a black and white issue. If we can register this in the case of Charlottesville, 
in the media coverage, then we could register a special bias of mediatization. Media 
are steered by professionalism and audience involvement (Hjarvard 2013, p. 26). News 
media should objectively present the arguments of both sides through the frame of 
conflict (de Vreese 2014), and also adapt to the attitude of the audience. Next section 
will show whether this actually happened. 
I will analyse one commercial and one public television news show in the USA 
in the period from 12 to 19 August 2017. PBS NewsHour is chosen to check whether 
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public TV can slow the expansion of commercial logic (Stromback 2008, p. 242). CBS 
Evening News is chosen because CBS’ owner Sumner Redstone is a “switcher” that 
supported both Democrats and Republicans and is expected to follow the commercial 
logic of transnational capital. This is important in Charlottesville’s case, where there 
were at least some extreme-right activists with brutal methods of social struggle, 
with tragic consequences – the death of a young woman. Covering Charlottesville in 
a professional, balanced way is a super-human challenge, but it is possible. With two 
different social movements confronted over Innis’ monuments as heavy media, a Pres-
ident that embodies the principle of Absolutism and an audience that is not ready to 
completely support any side, Charlottesville’s case seems like a good example of the 
bias of mediatization. My method is critical and highly qualitative, it is interpretative 
and multiperspectival in a sense that reads the media texts as embedded in the social, 
political and economic context (Kellner 1995, p. 4). It is interdisciplinary, meaning that 
articulation of discourse and its environment is essential for theorizing the interplay 
that is at the heart of the mediatization process. Therefore, frame analysis should be 
informed by a theoretical framework that deals with a Habermas’ and Kosseleck’s 
political confrontation within public sphere and the social structure supporting it.
Logic of the Enlightenment in Charlottesville
It was the weekend. This meant decision makers were having a day off. Journalists 
did not have much guidance and presented the events pretty straightforward. CBS 
reported it was a “clash between alt-right protesters and counter-demonstrators” and 
that there were “groups including the KKK and neo-Nazis”. Opposing sides fought 
“with little interference from the police”. Trump condemned the “display of hatred, 
bigotry and violence on many sides” and called for calm and unity. On the first day, 
this was not questioned. He was the Absolutist who blamed and subjugated all sides. 
Trump said “there is no place for this kind of violence in America”, and there were no 
political elite to say otherwise. Elite consensus and corporate ownership remained still. 
Both TV networks included already prepared segments about foreign leaders sending 
Trump a message to avoid rhetoric that could escalate into violence. If Trump “went 
too far” against North Korea, why would someone demand from him to do the same 
against the alt-right activists? PBS showed both sides of the struggle, and relied on 
the statements by the protesters themselves. The ones who were supporting the taking 
down of the Confederate statue blamed the White House for giving the licence for 
“fear and hate”, while the right-wing militia member said they “came here in peace, 
for freedom of speech”. Commercial network did not even mediate the reactions of the 
participants, while PBS chose the militia member as an alt-right representative. 
Sunday was a different day. Social and discourse structures were reconnected. CBS 
asked “was it domestic terrorism”? Trump was criticized for being “too vague” in 
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denouncing the white supremacists, but the centre of the show was expectedly the 
victim that “lost her life protesting hate”. Her Facebook comment “If you’re not out-
raged, you’re not paying attention” stood against “blood and soil” shouts of the racist 
crowd. Organizer of the rally accused police for not doing their jobs, while Trump 
maintained this is not his or Obama’s fault, but “has been going on for a long time”. 
PBS reported that members of Trump administration called it an act of racial bigotry, 
a criminal act, while Senator Orrin Hatch said Trump should “call evil by its name”. 
Other comments suggested Trump’s “dance with the devil” maybe have “unleashed 
the demons” that led to the chaos in Charlottesville. PBS also included the opinion 
of the other side, that accused the “radical leftists” for shouting “kill all the Nazis” 
and that “their definition of a Nazi is everyone they politically disagree with”. Peter 
Bergen, CNN Security analyst, maintained there was a rise in the White and Black 
nationalist attacks, as well as anti-Trump “leftist terrorism”, so security threat had 
“all ideological stripes”, even though the right-wing is most severe. That is, because 
the first day of the event was Saturday, the elites were not ready and their reaction 
was postponed for Sunday. Saturday was a day without the struggle of national and 
transnational capital, so the commercial media were not able to comment the event, 
while public TV covered both sides of the issue.
On Monday, public pressure worked. Trump said “Racism is evil” and condemned the 
KKK and other hate groups. CBS journalists maintained he was “slow to denounce” the 
white supremacists. A segment about the murderer revealed he was a “Hitler lover”, with 
an underlining message this kind of “love” is widespread. Transnational capital’s logic 
was working now. PBS was more critical and looked for the shades of grey. First, PBS 
was dealing with right-wing activists’ tactics, considering they got a lot of coverage, but 
also that both sides made headlines. Both sides will claim victory, “become calcified in 
their belief” and “outrageous in their rhetoric”. PBS also differentiated between domestic 
terrorism, the growing number of pro-white groups and the legacy of the Civil War. Ed-
ward Ayers (University of Richmond) said slavery usually did not play a leading narrative 
role. Confederacy is pictured as a libertarian defence against the central government, 
and statues were actually built by sons and daughters of the veterans in the process of 
mourning. Pure media logic, about family and emotion. That is, Ayers suggests, people 
see history through “different eyes” and statues can mean different things, but one should 
put them in the right context in order to completely understand the Southern heritage. 
PBS was less inclined to dramatize and intensify conflictual discourses, but was more 
sentimental towards Innis’ heavy media.
The most important thing that day was the departure of CEOs from President’s 
Business Councils. They found Trump morally repugnant and this was the last straw. 
However, Habermas’ view about economic power and political powerlessness casts 
a shadow of a doubt. While CBS reported council’s member found Trump’s “spirited 
defence of racism and bigotry unacceptable”, PBS suggested there’s a socio-economic 
background to it, rather than ethical. Trump’s statement about companies that man-
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ufacture in foreign countries and did not want to bring jobs back highlighted this. 
It was also found that Amazon is damaging small retailers and its CEO is an owner 
of Washington Post, which was critical of the President. PBS implied the interests of 
the transnational capital were the reason for CEOs’ departure and not just Trump’s 
behaviour. It is that Trump’s Presidency (or should we call it “Absolutism”) is creating 
problems for their transnational businesses. It was the conflict between authority and 
publicity that was at the heart of Habermas’ public sphere theory, and the events in 
Charlottesville showed this has not changed. 
But this is not the highlight of the whole problem. The question of the right-wing 
extremism could be directly related to the left-wing activism. PBS’ source said digital 
platforms like Google or Twitter were announcing they will stop supporting the right- 
-wing pages. But what these companies were actually doing is silencing the groups 
that are not right-wing at all. Targets were people who gather war crimes evidence or 
parody the website of the Chamber of Commerce. Digital platform’s discrimination 
hurts other people more than right-wing extremists. This means there are too many 
cases where “powerful people get to censor and take speech down”. This is not par-
adoxical if you are aware both sides are neoliberal. Therefore, both sides would like 
to see left-wing actors out of the picture. Actually, left-wing actors are the only one 
who can disturb the neoliberal hegemony, while the right-wing populism can only 
“temporarily suspend” the principle of the free society. This is the kind of populism 
I would call populism for neoliberalism. It is crucial to highlight that the exclusion 
of radical right-wing platforms was an excuse to exclude left-wing platforms, too. This 
was not an issue for Trump and his opponents, because it was in their mutual interest. 
Only PBS covered it. It was business and not in the public interest.
Therefore, while Trump said both sides are violent and blamed all, according to 
the Absolutist principle, Trump’s critics were also masking corporate wrongdoings 
behind righteous indignation. There is no clear choice in this. Trump defended all 
statues, not just of Confederate figures but of other slave owners like George Wash-
ington or Thomas Jefferson, the founding fathers. Commercial CBS worried Trump 
did not show “moral disgust” and invented the “alt-left” violence. PBS tried to under-
stand Trump’s enthusiasm for “beautiful statues” in another way. PBS had no doubt 
KKK was marching in Charlottesville against the social change, but is Trump one of 
them? Is he hiding his ideology behind the law and order rhetoric? Or he “lacks the 
imagination” and does not have the “collective memory” of clan’s violence? He does 
claim all those people in Charlottesville were not neo-Nazis, and PBS’ poll showed 
62% of people think that statues should remain as historical symbols. The poll also 
showed the majority was not satisfied with Trump’s reaction, but if the media were 
receiver steered, than the logic should adapt to this paradoxical poll results. Can 62% 
of people be Hitler lovers? If Stig Hjarvard is right, and the audience involvement is 
shaping media logic, then the attitude of the majority of the citizens should change the 
commercial media’s approach.
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After the poll came out, CBS tried a different approach. Now, following Steve Ban-
non’s words, the far right were “clowns”, and the Democrats were too focused on the race 
and identity, instead of economy. CBS reported that Andrew Young, a civil rights icon, 
said it is “too costly to re-fight the Civil War”, but what does that mean? It was reported 
that a great grandson of a Confederate commander said he is “ashamed of the monu-
ment but not Stonewall Jackson himself ”, without explanation what is the difference 
between the two. This implied some statue is the biggest problem in the USA. The only 
choice CBS gave to its audience is a “Holocaust-like memorial” or “removing identity 
politics” altogether, and both came from African American sources. A frame of conflict, 
the dramatical “deep and ugly division”, seems to be the only media logic construct CBS 
is able to produce. Intensifying the conflict and creating a black and white issue, while 
62% of citizens did not see it that way, should be interpreted as a sign that the commercial 
media logic is not that receiver steering. It is corporate foremost.
Usually, populism is understood as a strategy that will criticize other people’s sym-
bols and rights but not their own (Bjerre 2016, p. 23). That is, right-wing populists 
cannot contribute to political progress. However, PBS showed something different. 
The host interviewed a South Carolina’s secessionist and African American national-
ist, a White Christian and a Black Muslim, that came together to preserve peace and 
“collaborate for the public good”. The Black nationalist maintained “taking down the 
statues does not end systematic oppression”, nor does it “raise the economic condi-
tions”. This is not just a race but a “class issue”. He would be happy if the statues were 
removed, but this is not a priority. White secessionist looked at him and was not 
happy about it. Nevertheless, he said he has “more in common” with a Black Muslim 
than with the people from Charlottesville, who made things worse. He still wants to 
defend the Southern heritage, but not in a racist or neo-Nazi way. This was what 62% 
of Americans believe and what commercial media could not report. PBS produced 
a very consensual worldview without jeopardizing its non-neoliberal and non-racist 
agenda. On the other hand, CBS chose to support neoliberalism through its progressive 
attack on the alt-right. But how progressive is it with neoliberalism in the background?
Conclusions
Commercial media logic showed itself as less committed to the general audience 
than to the principles of the liberal public sphere of the Enlightenment era. For Haber-
mas, this was an era of economically powerful actors that wanted to translate their 
power to the political sphere, which brought the French Revolution. The discourse 
of progress moved the ideal society from distant lands to the future. That way, reality 
became a temporalized Platonism: things are bad now and it will be fixed soon. The 
problem is in the feudal past. The absolute ruler is the force against progress and 
democracy. In the past, there’s only exploitation and intolerance.
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Habermas’ public sphere was marked not by one-dimensional progress but a di-
alectic of authority and publicity, a mode of balancing power, a dialogue with the 
possibilities of compromise. Once this balancing was replaced by colonization, the 
relationship of the state and the market was not a win-win situation. With a weak 
state and strong globalization, corporate media were less inclined to balance between 
powers. Even though Charlottesville is a hard case, it showed commercial media 
logic as a neoliberal force that is implementing a highly controlled future. In a free 
society, we cannot plan this. The idea there can be “one best society for everyone” is 
“incredible” (Nozick 1999, p. 311).
Therefore, the relationship of mediatization to populism is twofold. It is not just the 
construction of media populism by the national capital’s media. It is also embodied by 
a transnational capital’s media bias. That is, both sides imply the other one is fake. Yet, 
Habermasian framework focuses on interests and relates social to discourse structures. 
It shows conservative forces as more inclined to national capital and the authority of 
the President, while progressive forces were more present within transnational capital 
networks, seeking multicultural utopia, without questioning social contradictions 
seriously. This highly ambivalent, neoliberalized position of commercial media I have 
called the bias of mediatization.
We have seen perfectio ideal seeks to shut down not just right-wing paleo-utopias, 
but any other competitors. PBS’ more informative coverage followed Innis’ idea of 
checking the biases, and this made its critical position stronger. CBS’ neoliberal ap-
proach brought one vision for the world that actually did the same thing as Donald 
Trump himself: it suspended other discourses. This is not the best solution for the 
postmodern condition of cultural diversity. The task of political liberalism is the 
construction of a framework for many times and many utopias. For mediatization 
research the question is whether this can be a commercial framework. From the crit-
ical perspective, I believe the public media such as PBS can actually show a different 
path for media’s institutionalisation.
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